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ABSTRACT 
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In 2015, the United States Supreme Court effectively made same-sex marriage legal 
throughout the country. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy opined that not extending 
marriage equality to same-sex couples violated both their autonomy and their right to equal 
dignity under the law. Three years earlier, a same-sex couple visited Masterpiece Cakeshop, a 
bakery in Colorado, and requested that the owner design and create a cake to celebrate their 
same-sex wedding. The owner declined, advising the couple that he did not provide wedding 
cakes for same-sex weddings due to his religious beliefs. He was found guilty of violating the 
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In this 
paper, I present a liberal argument for the proposition that narrowly-tailored exemptions ought 
to be provided to wedding vendors such as Phillips with religious objections to same-sex 
marriage. In arguing for this claim, I provide a compromise between those who believe that the 
relevant anti-discrimination provisions should be categorically applied to all businesses open to 
the public and proponents of religious liberty who maintain that any business with religious 
objections to same-sex marriage should be able to refuse service to same-sex couples. 
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In Obergefell v. Hodges, the United States Supreme Court effectively made same-sex 
marriage legal throughout the country.1 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy opined that 
not extending marriage equality to same-sex couples violated both their autonomy and their 
right to equal dignity under the law.2 Even as he argued that the Constitution extends the right 
to marry to same-sex couples, he also insisted that there are many citizens of the United States 
who reach the conclusion that same-sex marriage is wrong “based on decent and honorable 
religious or philosophical premises” and that such people are reasonable, sincere and hold this 
belief in good faith.3 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Roberts argued that the Court intervening 
in the political process on the issue of same-sex marriage would close the minds of those who 
disagreed with the institution and would have potentially negative consequences for how it 
would be accepted by the broader society.4 
 It seems, in part, that Justice Robert’s prediction has come true. Although the Court’s 
decision made it perfectly legal for same-sex couples to get married in all fifty states, a lack of 
consistent anti-discrimination protections put such couples in a precarious position. For 
example, a year after the Obergefell ruling, Russell Roybal, deputy executive director of the 
National LGBTQ Task Force, stated that “in a lot of places, [same-sex couples] can go to [their] 
county clerk and get a marriage license and get married and then get fired the next week 
because now [they] are openly gay.”5 The suggestion made by Roybal is that, while achieving 
                                                           
1Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
2Ibid., 2593-2608. 
3Ibid., 2594-2602. 
4Ibid., 2611-2633 (Justice Roberts dissenting). 
5Liam Stack, “The Challenges That Remain for L.G.B.T. People After Marriage Ruling,” The New York Times, June 30, 
2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/us/the-challenges-that-remain-for-lgbt-people-after-marriage-
ruling.html. 
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marriage equality may have been a net positive for the gay community, the Court’s ruling on 
this matter has not been without substantial social costs. 
 While the LGBTQ community and its allies strive for adequate anti-discrimination 
provisions, in the states and municipalities where those regulations are in place, business 
owners with religious beliefs about the sinful nature of same-sex marriage have been adversely 
affected as a result of them. In 2014, Christian farm owners in New York were fined $10,000 for 
declining to host a same-sex wedding ceremony on their property.6 A year before that, the 
Supreme Court of New Mexico found that a business, Elane Photography, violated the New 
Mexico Human Rights Act by refusing to photograph a commitment ceremony between two 
women.7 In June of 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States accepted a similar case which 
involves this tension between anti-discrimination laws and the religious convictions of certain 
business owners in the wedding industry. The case involves Jack Phillips, an owner of a bakery 
who lost a case in the Colorado Court of Appeals for refusing to sell a wedding cake to a gay 
couple.8 In effect, Phillips is requesting that he be exempted from the Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Act on account of his religious beliefs. 
 In this paper, I present a liberal argument for the proposition that narrowly-tailored 
exemptions ought to be provided to wedding vendors with religious objections to same-sex 
marriage. In arguing for this claim, I reconcile the Court’s statement that reasonable citizens 
can disagree with the institution of same-sex marriage with the government’s stated interests 
                                                           
6Sarah Pulliam Bailey, “Farm owners fined for saying no to lesbian wedding,” The Washington Post, August 19, 
2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/religion/farm-owners-fined-for-saying-no-to-lesbian-
wedding/2014/08/19/1cfe5ca2-27dd-11e4-8b10-7db129976abb_story.html. 
7Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 56 (2013). 
8Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d 272 (2015). This case is being heard by the Supreme Court as 
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. 
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in preventing invidious discrimination. Furthermore, I hope to provide a compromise between 
those who believe that the relevant anti-discrimination provisions should be categorically 
applied to all businesses open to the public and proponents of religious liberty who maintain 
that any business with religious objections to same-sex marriage should be able to refuse 
service to same-sex couples. I maintain that there are situations in which business owners in 
the wedding industry are substantially burdened by public accommodation laws and that 
providing narrowly-tailored exemptions does not undermine the government’s compelling 
interests in applying such laws. At the same time, I believe that the burdens experienced by 
business owners should be balanced against the harms experienced by same-sex couples who 
are refused service in the public marketplace.  
 By limiting my discussion in this way, I am avoiding many other contentious issues such 
as whether tax-exempt religious organizations should be compelled to facilitate same-sex 
marriages or whether government officials should be exempted from regulations requiring 
them to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.9 While some of the arguments I put 
forward could be extended to these cases, I do not intend the reasoning I employ to be 
analogous nor would I expect to arrive at the same conclusion were I to address those 
scenarios. The narrow question I will address in this paper is whether there are scenarios in 
which wedding vendors should be exempt from public accommodation laws and, if so, what 
conditions ought to be met for the exemptions to be granted. 
 In section one I frame the debate as a conflict between two fundamental liberal values 
and argue that a balancing approach should be used to mediate the seeming conflict. I also 
                                                           
9For discussion of these issues, see Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello Jr., and Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds., 
Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Emerging Conflicts (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2008). 
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explicitly note what the objects of the religious exemptions at issue are (that is, the specific 
laws which certain businesses ought to be exempt from). In section two, I present a liberal 
framework developed by Kevin Vallier for deciding when religious exemptions to legitimately 
enacted laws are warranted. I apply this framework to the facts of Masterpiece Cakeshop v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission and argue that the petitioner in that case warrants an 
exemption under the conditions which Vallier set out. In section three, I discuss how the 
exemptions I defend would be narrowly-tailored and why they would not undermine the 
government’s compelling interests underlying anti-discrimination regulations. I conclude in 
section four by considering some objections to my view. 
§1. Religious Liberty and Equality: A Case of Conflicting Values 
 One way to frame the dispute between religious business owners in the wedding 
industry and same-sex couples is as a conflict between two fundamental liberal values: equality 
and liberty. Equality is enshrined as a political value in the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While the Fourteenth 
Amendment extends to all citizens “equal protection of the laws,”10 Title II of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 was enacted to prevent unjust discrimination in places of public accommodation 
and to ensure equal access to goods and services. It states: 
 All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
 facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public 
 accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the 
 ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.11 
 
                                                           
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
11Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a (1964). In 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act supplemented 
the language of the federal law by including disability as a protected class. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 12182 (1990). 
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While the federal public accommodation law does not include sexual orientation as a protected 
characteristic, twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have explicit prohibitions against 
sexual orientation discrimination in the realm of public accommodations.12 The definitions of 
public accommodation utilized in state statutes are also typically broader than the definition 
utilized in the federal law.13 For instance, Colorado’s public accommodation law defines a 
“place of public accommodation” as “any place of business engaged in any sales to the public 
and any place offering services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to the 
public.”14 I take Colorado’s law to be a model public accommodation law for my purposes. That 
is, the laws I have in mind when discussing exemptions are those laws which prohibit 
businesses open to the public from discriminating on the basis of an enumerated list of 
specified characteristics – sexual orientation being among them. The businesses I have in mind 
are those which provide goods or services for weddings or comparable events (such as 
commitment ceremonies). 
 Wedding vendors who have been accused of violating public accommodation laws 
invariably cite concerns that their liberty is being undermined by said laws. Specifically, when 
these cases go to court, the vendors generally argue that the application of public 
                                                           
12Issac Saidel-Goley, “The Right Side of History: Prohibiting Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Public 
Accommodations, Housing, and Employment,” Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender & Society 31 (2016): 121. 
13 The federal statute limits places of public accommodation to “lodgings, facilities principally engaged in selling 
food for consumption on the premises; gasoline stations; places of exhibition or entertainment” or any 
establishment “(i) which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this 
subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment.” See Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a (1964). 
14 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, C.R.S.A. § 24-34-601 (2014). A limit placed on this definition is such that places 
of public accommodation would not include “a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used 
for religious purposes.” 
6 
 
accommodation laws violate their First Amendment rights.15 The First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution states, in part, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech. . .”16 Phillips, the owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop has cited both the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Free Speech Clause in arguments before the Colorado Court of Appeals and the 
United States Supreme Court. Phillips argued that application of Colorado’s public 
accommodation law compels him to choose between violating his religious commitments and 
violating the law. In addition, he argued that the conduct of creating a wedding cake is 
inherently expressive and that any law which compels him to create wedding cakes for 
particular weddings thereby compels him to express a message of approval for those 
weddings.17 Therefore, the law as applied is a burden on his freedom of expression and 
religious exercise. If this is true, then his business and others like it deserve an exemption from 
public accommodation laws – or so the argument goes. 
 Opponents of exemptions, on the other hand, argue that the purpose underlying public 
accommodation laws is not to violate the constitutional rights of business owners and that the 
laws effectively do not do so. Rather, their purpose and effect is to guarantee that individuals 
with particular characteristics are not unjustly discriminated against in the public marketplace. 
Such discrimination can have tangible material costs such as limiting access to important goods 
                                                           
15 Careful legal arguments would actually implicate both the First and Fourteenth Amendments as the rights listed 
in the First Amendment have only been made applicable against state governments through the Due Process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
16 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
17 Craig, 370 P.3d at 272. 
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and services. It can also cause serious, though arguably immeasurable, harm on the dignity of 
those discriminated against.  
 The aforementioned positions illustrate that there is a prima facie conflict between the 
value of equality appealed to by proponents of broad application of anti-discrimination 
provisions and the value of liberty appealed to by their opponents. This conflict can be phrased 
in simple terms. In order to maintain the equal treatment of minorities in the public 
marketplace, there need to be limits placed on the liberty of businesses open to the public and 
their owners. For the purposes of this paper, I concede that this is true with respect to certain 
immutable characteristics such as sexual orientation. For instance, no business should be 
allowed to refuse to serve an individual solely based on their sexual orientation. The crux of the 
debate then, as I see it, is not whether anti-discrimination laws justifiably place limits on the 
liberty of citizens but what the boundaries of those limits should be.  
 There are two diametrically opposed positions that one could take regarding this issue. 
The first, what might be called the ‘equality approach,’ is that the equality of same-sex couples 
should trump any liberty interests which vendors may have.18 In effect, this position maintains 
that the rights to religious exercise and freedom of expression should never include the right to 
discriminate in the public marketplace on the basis of protected characteristics. The second 
position may be called the ‘religious liberty approach.’19 This position maintains that when 
there is a bona fide religious objection to same-sex marriage present, the business in question 
should be allowed to refuse service to same-sex couples. In this paper, I take myself to be 
                                                           
18 Steven J. Heyman, “A Struggle for Recognition: The Controversy over Religious Liberty, Civil Rights, and Same-Sex 
Marriage,” First Amendment Law Review 14 (2015): 48-52. 
19 Ibid., 52-53. 
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offering a compromise between these two positions which values both the equal treatment of 
all parties and the liberty interests at stake. Before I turn to my positive argument, I will offer 
brief arguments for why the ‘equality approach’ and the ‘religious liberty approach’ should be 
abandoned in favor of an approach that balances the underlying values at play. 
1.1. The Equality Approach 
 As stated earlier, equality as a political value is invoked in both the federal public 
accommodation law and the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Those who 
defend the equality approach maintain that the value of equal treatment should trump any 
appeals to religious liberty. My argument against the equality approach is twofold. First, I 
maintain that any sufficiently robust right to religious exercise will include the right to 
discriminate in a way that many might see as invidious or unjust. Second, even if this right does 
not adequately motivate granting exemptions in the public accommodation context, equality 
interests can be invoked on both sides of the disputes. Thus, any approach which categorically 
treats the value of equality as superior to religious liberty risks either inconsistent or unfair 
application. 
 My first claim is that any sufficient right to exercise religion will include some right to 
discriminate, perhaps invidiously. One paradigmatic example of this is the so-called ‘ministerial 
exemption.’ In 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided a case regarding a teacher who 
filed suit for unlawful dismissal under the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act against her 
former employer, an Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in Michigan. The Court 
unanimously held that federal anti-discrimination laws do not apply to the employment of 
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ministers or religious leaders by religious organizations.20 There is ample room for debate 
regarding what positions should count as ‘ministerial’ and which organizations should count as 
‘religious.’ But there is almost no disagreement amongst those who value religious liberty that 
religious organizations should be able to discriminate against some classes of individuals in 
choosing who to hire as ministers. This ability to discriminate is essential to the autonomy of 
religious organizations. For instance, take a Christian church. Nearly everybody agrees that such 
a church should be able to discriminate against non-Christians in hiring their minister(s). 
Perhaps more controversially, many churches believe that women should not, or cannot due to 
theological fiat, serve in certain positions of religious authority. Thus, many churches 
discriminate against women when they hire ministers. Both types of discrimination – 
discrimination against women and non-Christians – would be in plain violation of federal anti-
discrimination law if courts and legislators did not recognize an exemption for religious 
organizations. As stated earlier, there is room for debate regarding the specific details but any 
sufficient right to religious exercise will include some right to discriminate – the most 
uncontroversial case being religious organizations having the right to discriminate against non-
members of the religion in hiring for positions of religious authority.  
 A likely response to this point is that it is irrelevant for the current discussion. 
Opponents of exemptions to public accommodation laws could easily concede that the 
ministerial exemption represents a unique and narrow set of cases where exemptions are 
appropriate and that it does not establish that exemptions would be appropriate in the public 
accommodation context. This is true and I only point to the ministerial exemption to rebut the 
                                                           
20 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S. 
171 (2012). 
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proposition that religious liberty never includes the right to discriminate. If the ministerial 
exemption is appropriate, then there are at least some cases where exempting parties from 
anti-discrimination laws is appropriate and the value of equality should not universally override 
religious liberty concerns. I now turn to my second claim, aimed primarily at those who may not 
believe that the ministerial exemption is appropriate or those who do not think it gives us any 
reason to believe that exemptions would be appropriate in the public accommodation context. 
My second claim is this: both sides of legal disputes concerning the application of public 
accommodation laws in the wedding industry can appeal to the value of equality in defending 
their positions. Let us look first at the same-sex couples who have brought law suits against 
wedding vendors who refused to serve them. Their argument is that by refusing service, 
vendors have treated them unequally. Let us grant for the moment that this is true. In other 
words, I am willing to concede that vendors do treat same-sex couples unequally by refusing 
service to them.21 Furthermore, they are treating them unequally on the basis of a 
characteristic explicitly protected by anti-discrimination provisions – sexual orientation. Such 
unequal treatment is precisely why anti-discrimination regulations were instituted so granting 
exemptions to them, either legislatively or through judicial review, would seem to undermine 
their very purpose. 
 While one of the purposes of public accommodation laws is to prevent unequal 
treatment by businesses in the public marketplace, application of them often leads to unequal 
                                                           
21 Although I am willing to concede this point, it is not obvious that it is true. For example, wedding vendors who 
refuse service to same-sex couples may make the argument that they would refuse service to any customer if they 
thought that serving said customer would facilitate a religious ceremony they found disagreeable or offensive. In 
these cases, vendors often argue that they are not refusing service on the basis of sexual orientation but rather 
because they find the conduct of a same-sex wedding immoral and do not wish to be associated with it. Courts 
have typically rejected this distinction between conduct and identity characteristics as the conduct of a same-sex 
wedding is so closely associated with identifying as a homosexual.  
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treatment by state or federal governments. For instance, take the case of Elaine Huguenin, the 
owner of Elane Photography. When asked to photograph a commitment ceremony between 
two women, Huguenin refused citing her religious beliefs. Her refusal was found to be in 
violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act. There is one sense in which application of the 
New Mexico law is perfectly equal. Every business in New Mexico which opens itself up to the 
general public is subject to this law and cannot refuse customers on the basis of sexual 
orientation. But not all business owners believe that providing their goods and services to 
same-sex couples implicates their moral or religious commitments in any significant way. For 
those that do, laws such as the New Mexico Human Rights Act compel them to choose between 
living their professional lives in accordance with their religious commitments, obeying the law 
or possibly giving up their financial and personal stability by shutting down their business.22 
Because of this, New Mexico’s public accommodation law and others like it enforce an unequal 
distribution of burdens and benefits. Religious business owners who believe that operating 
their business in line with their religious commitments entails refusing service to same-sex 
couples are burdened by public accommodation laws by having to compromise their religious 
identity or their financial/personal stability. Business owners who do not share these beliefs are 
not burdened in the same way. 
 Thus, the ‘equality approach’ entails one of two commitments. The first is that courts 
and legislators should attempt to guarantee the equal treatment of the same-sex couples in the 
                                                           
22 In some jurisdictions, the choice of ‘shutting down’ their business may be too starkly worded. For example, if 
Elane Photography ceased to operate a publicly accessible website and relied on word of mouth rather than public 
marketing for business, it could be that courts would not deem her a public accommodation. In that case, the issue 
of whether she discriminated against would-be customers or whether such discrimination is protected by 
constitutional amendments or statutes would not even arise. Taking such actions, however, may still risk the 
financial stability of the business if the website or public marketing was a large producer of business transactions.  
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public marketplace which would also guarantee the unequal treatment of religious business 
owners by the government. This would require an account of why we should elevate the equal 
treatment of one group over that of another. Alternatively, courts and legislators could attempt 
to draw some sort of line to adjudicate when they favor the equality of one group over another. 
In this case, equality is not acting as a ‘trump’ but is operating as one value among many. But 
this is inconsistent with the equality approach. 
1.2. The Religious Liberty Approach 
 To reiterate, the religious liberty approach maintains that whenever a wedding vendor 
has a sincere religious objection to same-sex marriage, they ought to be granted an exemption 
to relevant public accommodation laws. Similar to the equality approach, I object to this 
approach on two fronts. First, just as there are equality interests on both sides, there are also 
liberty interests on both sides. Second, even if there is a compelling reason why we should treat 
‘religious’ liberty more importantly than the liberty of same-sex couples in the public 
marketplace, giving categorical deference to appeals to religious liberty would drastically 
undermine the purposes of anti-discrimination law. 
 It is fairly uncontroversial that anti-discrimination laws enforce limits on liberty. If 
businesses wish to discriminate, then such laws impede their ability to do so. Thus, in the public 
accommodation context, anti-discrimination laws are a limit on the negative liberty on 
otherwise discriminatory businesses. Negative liberty is often defined as freedom from 
interference, where such interference can take the form of external obstacles, barriers or 
constraints. In this case, the constraint on the liberty of business owners takes the form of anti-
discrimination laws backed by government coercion and authority. The fact that these laws do 
13 
 
infringe on the negative liberty of certain persons should be relatively uncontroversial and does 
not automatically entail any particular evaluative judgment about the law.23 
 However, as philosophers working on liberty and freedom have long noted, negative 
liberty is not the only type of freedom worth caring about. There is also what has often been 
called positive liberty or, alternatively, autonomy. I save my full discussion on how the 
autonomy of same-sex couples can be affected by invidious discrimination for a later section 
but I will briefly note here how I intend to cash out this claim. Not only does discrimination by 
businesses affect the autonomy of same-sex couples by limiting their range of options in the 
public marketplace, it also affects their capacity to be fully autonomous agents by undermining 
their sense of self-worth and self-respect. Thus, defenders of the religious liberty approach are 
not categorical defenders of liberty per se but liberty of a particular kind, namely, religious 
liberty. Just as was the case with the equality approach, this particular commitment would 
require an account of why we ought to treat religious liberty as more important than the liberty 
of same-sex couples. 
 Let us assume for the moment that there is such an account – that is, there are 
compelling reasons for why we ought to treat religious liberty as having a special status. Even if 
this is true, I maintain that categorical deference to those vendors who have religious 
objections to same-sex marriage would drastically undermine the purposes of anti-
discrimination law. Even if the exemptions were limited to the wedding industry (which could 
likely be accomplished through statutory provisions – be they federal or state), these 
                                                           
23 In fact, I assume throughout this paper that some infringements on the liberty of otherwise discriminatory 
business owners are justified. I do not believe, however, that categorical application of the law is justified as I 
believe that exemptions ought to be granted in certain instances. 
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exemptions would extend to a whole host of businesses: bakers, florists, tailors, restaurants, 
banquet halls, photographers, hotels, etc. It is also not clear what principled distinction could 
be made to justify granting exemptions to businesses with religious objections to same-sex 
marriage but not those businesses with religious objections to interracial marriages or 
interreligious marriages. Again, this distinction could just be created within the language of a 
statute but the affordance of even these legislatively crafted exemptions to businesses which 
have religious objections to same-sex marriage would mean that the potential for same-sex 
couples to be excluded from an entire part of the public marketplace would be present (even if 
unlikely). The mere fact that the potential is real, however, and made possible through 
government efforts should give pause to any liberal who endorses the anti-discrimination 
principle underlying the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection clause.24 
These are just a few reasons why we should abandon the equality approach and the 
religious liberty approach in favor of an approach which balances the opposing interests of the 
parties. No doubt some readers have found them ultimately unconvincing or can think of 
objections or arguments which I have not considered. This is inevitable as my primary intent in 
this paper is not to prove that these approaches are wrong (though I believe that they are) but 
is rather to present a positive argument for granting exemptions. I turn to this argument in the 
following sections.  
§2. A Liberal Account of Religious Exemptions 
 In the following two sections, I offer a positive liberal argument for granting religious 
exemptions to public accommodation laws. I call it a ‘liberal’ argument because liberals are 
                                                           
24 It should be stated that this argument is stated on strictly liberal grounds. Whatever kind of liberalism one 
espouses, I assume that it holds some pride of place to the value of equality.  
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conventionally committed to the values of liberty and equality. Furthermore, a general task of a 
liberal political philosophy is to conceive of principles or policies which will help citizens live in a 
society which is pluralistic in nature. In other words, there is deep disagreement amongst 
citizens regarding matters of morality, religion and philosophy and one task of liberalism is to 
try and discover a way for citizens to live together in such a pluralistic society with as little 
conflict as possible.  
A core commitment of liberal political theory is a presumption of liberty. That is, liberals 
generally assume that citizens should be free to conduct their lives in the way they see fit and 
any government intervention into that freedom requires justification. Kevin Vallier has recently 
developed a framework for when religious exemptions to legitimately enacted laws are publicly 
justified. Public justification plays a central role in liberal theories which hold that political rules 
or laws ought to be, “in some sense, justifiable or acceptable to all those persons over whom 
the rules purport to have authority.”25 This insight, which received a thorough treatment in the 
work of John Rawls, is that publicly justified laws are necessary “for there to exist over time a 
just and stable society of free and equal citizens who still remain profoundly divided by 
reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. . .”26 While I do adopt Vallier’s public 
justification framework going forward, I do not directly argue that it is the appropriate 
interpretation of what liberal political theory entails as doing so would be beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
                                                           
25 Jonathan Quong, "Public Reason," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/public-reason/>. 
26 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 47. 
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 The framework which Vallier set out is in the public justification tradition because he 
asserted that if the four conditions he laid out are met, then the exemption in question is 
publicly justified. Vallier argued that there are four conditions which, if met, warrant a religious 
exemption for any particular person:27 
(a) if she has sufficient intelligible reason to oppose the law, (b) if the law imposes 
unique and substantial burdens on the integrity of those exempted that are not off-set 
by comparable benefits, (c) if the large majority of citizens have sufficient reason to 
endorse the law, and (d) if the exemption does not impose significant costs on other 
parties that require redress. If these four conditions are met, then legislative and/or 
judicial bodies morally should carve out an exemption for those requesting them.28 
 
In explicating and modifying these conditions, I analyze a current case before the Supreme 
Court of the United States, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. While 
Vallier did suggest that his account may require granting an exemption to religious businesses 
like Masterpiece Cakeshop, it is my goal in this paper to make this argument explicit.29 
2.1. A Look at Masterpiece Cakeshop 
                                                           
27 I am using the term ‘person’ here in the legal and not philosophical sense of the word. Whatever philosophers 
mean by the concept, I am following the Dictionary Act in that my use of the word includes “corporations, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.” See 
Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C.A. § 1. The Supreme Court also held in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby that corporations are able to 
possess religious beliefs and exercise a religion. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). I 
think this is contestable but it does not matter much for my purposes as a denial of the claim would not change the 
substance of my argument. 
28 Kevin Vallier, “The Moral Basis of Religious Exemptions,” Law and Philosophy 35 (2016): 3. Vallier noted that 
legal bodies may have sufficient legal reason to follow judicial procedures (or other legal procedures presumably) if 
they lead in a direction inconsistent with the framework he defended. Vallier did not point out, however, that 
there may also be broadly moral or philosophical reasons to think that courts in particular should not follow the 
dictates laid out by this framework. For instance, one might argue that if courts read these conditions into the First 
Amendment or other religious freedom statutes, then that might be an impermissible occurrence of judicial 
discretion. This does not have to be a strictly legal argument. Rather, it could be a broadly moral or philosophical 
argument regarding the role of judicial review or judges more generally in a democratic society. I do not go into 
that issue in this paper but it might be more appealing if we limited the argument to what legislators ought to do 
or what judicial bodies have a pro tanto reason to do provided such a reason is not overridden by other concerns. 
29 This is not meant to indicate that Vallier would likely agree with my reasoning or that the argument I present 
would be one that Vallier thinks is consistent with his account. Indeed, there is reason to believe that he would 
disagree with me on multiple points given the fact that I am modifying some of his conditions in substantial ways. 
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 In 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins visited Masterpiece Cakeshop and requested 
that Jack Phillips design and create a cake to celebrate their same-sex wedding. Phillips 
declined, advising Craig and Mullins that he did not provide wedding cakes for same-sex 
weddings due to his religious beliefs. While he told them that he would create and provide 
them with any other baked goods other than a wedding cake, they left the shop without 
purchasing anything and without discussing any potential wedding cake designs with Phillips. 
Craig and Mullins later filed charges of discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Division. 
Phillips was found guilty of violating the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) for 
discriminating against Craig and Mullins because of their sexual orientation.30 
A. Sufficient and Intelligible Reasons 
 The first condition which Vallier set out is that persons requesting an exemption must 
have “sufficient intelligible reason to oppose the law.”31 He wrote that “when public reason 
liberals say that someone has sufficient reason to endorse a law or policy, they typically mean 
that the balance of her justificatory reasons favors the policy.”32 The same is true for when 
citizens oppose laws. For someone to have sufficient reason to oppose a law or policy, the 
balance of their justificatory reasons must favor opposing the law or policy in question. The 
concept of ‘justificatory reasons’ is often subject to idealization. Vallier proposed a moderate 
form of idealization in defending his account. For one’s reasons to serve as justificatory under 
this moderate idealization, they must be epistemically justified and arrived at via sound rules of 
                                                           
30 Craig 370 P.3d at 276-277. 
31 Vallier, “The Moral Basis of Religious Exemptions,” 3. 
32 Ibid., 5. 
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inference. They must also be logically consistent or, at the very least, not obviously 
inconsistent.33 
 The reasons which can serve as epistemic defeaters to laws are also constrained by the 
intelligibility requirement. The intelligibility requirement can be stated as follows: 
Intelligibility: A’s reason X is intelligible for members of the public if and only if members 
of the public regard X as epistemically justified for A according to A’s evaluative 
standards.34 
 
This definition of intelligibility illustrates that, for a reason to be intelligible to the public, it is 
not necessary that members of the public accept the reason themselves. For instance, an 
atheist can see beliefs based on the Bible as epistemically justified for Christians because many 
Christians take the Bible as authoritative or properly basic. For instance, if we look at the facts 
of Masterpiece Cakeshop, it is uncontested that Phillips has been a Christian for over thirty 
years and believes in Jesus Christ as his Lord and Savior.35 Being a Christian for Phillips likely 
includes the belief that the Bible is an authoritative text on issues of morality and how one 
should live one’s life. Because the Bible proclaims the sinfulness of same-sex relationships,36 
Phillips believes that facilitating same-sex marriages by designing and providing wedding cakes 
for them would make him complicit in sin and would “displease God.”37 This is an intelligible 
belief for him to have even if we do not accept the assumptions implicit in his worldview.  
                                                           
33 Kevin Vallier, Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation (New York: Routledge, 2014), 161-163. Vallier 
also argues against the ‘radical idealization’ that is often employed by public reason liberals. 
34 Kevin Vallier and Fred D’Agostino, "Public Justification", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/justification-public/>. 
See Vallier, “The Moral Basis of Religious Exemptions,” 7 and Liberal Politics and Public Faith, 183. 
35 Craig, 370 P.3d at 277. 
36 Lev. 18: 22, 20:13 NRSV. 
37 Craig, 370 P.3d at 277. 
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The Bible also expresses a straightforward prohibition on males having sexual 
relationships with other males when it states that “if a man lies with a male as with a woman, 
both of them have committed an abomination.”38 As marriage often includes, in part, a sexual 
relationship, Phillips does not want to facilitate such a relationship which he sees as prohibited 
by his religious ideology. CADA compels him to do this. Thus, he has an intelligible reason to 
oppose the law as applied to him. 
One possible objection to the intelligibility requirement is that it might seem to be too 
easy to fulfill. For instance, consider a fictional baker who does not believe that certain types of 
human beings are people. He justifies this by appealing to a religious text, much like the appeal 
to Biblical scripture. Furthermore, he firmly believes that only people have birthdays and that it 
would be morally wrong to provide birthday cakes for non-people. Doing so would require him 
to go against his religious convictions. Must we see this as an intelligible reason? Assuming for 
the sake of argument that it does actually follow from a straightforward reading of the fictional 
text that certain classes of human beings are not really people and that providing birthday 
cakes to them would be in violation of religious prescriptions, the response would seem to be 
yes. But those readers tempted to endorse this objection may not fully appreciate that 
intelligible reasons are not dispositive. We can maintain that all sorts of intelligible reasons can 
serve as justificatory under this model but yet do not warrant granting exemptions on account 
of them. For this objection to be compelling, this framework would have to allow exemptions to 
pass muster which would have consequences that liberals would seemingly not be able to 
                                                           
38 Lev. 20:13 NRSV. 
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endorse given their philosophical commitments. But that would require an additional argument 
rather than the insistence that the intelligibility requirement is too permissive. 
 The third condition is that the large majority of citizens have sufficient reason to 
endorse the law. The reason for this condition is that the appropriate thing for legislators to do 
if the majority of citizens did not have sufficient reason to endorse the law would be to work to 
repeal it, not craft specialized exemptions to it. Courts and legal scholars have noted several 
purposes underlying anti-discrimination laws. Here I simply note them and assume that they 
serve as sufficient reasons that a majority of people have to support public accommodation 
laws. The purposes are as follows (in no particular order): 1) to ensure and maintain equal 
access to publicly available goods and services, 2) to eradicate barriers to the equal treatment 
of all citizens in the public marketplace, 3) to stigmatize the practice of discrimination in the 
public marketplace, 4) to maintain the social order, and 5) to prevent dignitary harm. 
B. Integrity and Substantial Burdens 
 The second condition is that “the law imposes unique and substantial burdens on the 
integrity of those exempted that are not off-set by comparable benefits.”39 Vallier defined a 
substantial burden as “one that significantly sets back one’s capacity to advance her interests 
and core ideals and doctrines.”40 A person has integrity “when she is true to her character, 
projects, plans and beliefs.”41 This definition of integrity draws upon Loren Lomasky’s account 
of persons and projects. Briefly stated, Lomasky defines projects as those ends “which reach 
indefinitely into the future, play a central role within the ongoing endeavors of the individual, 
                                                           
39 Vallier, “The Moral Basis of Religious Exemptions,” 3. 
40 Ibid., 13. 
41 Ibid., 12. 
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and provide a significant degree of structural stability to an individual’s life.”42 As these projects 
provide structural stability to our lives, they are partially constitutive of our personal identities. 
Furthermore, because they are partially constitutive of our identities, our personal integrity is 
threatened when the government passes laws which impede our ability to accomplish these 
ends. 
 My claim is that the personal integrity of Phillips is burdened by the application of 
Colorado’s public accommodation law. There are two ways in which CADA burdens his integrity. 
The first is that it undermines his ability to live according to what he believes are mandates of 
his religion. Obviously, I will not attempt to detail, nor do I pretend to know, most of Phillips’ 
religious beliefs or commitments. However, as stated earlier, part of his web of projects and 
beliefs is likely substantially related to his identity as a Christian. He “believes that decorating 
cakes is a form of art, that he can honor God through his artistic talents, and that he would 
displease God by creating cakes for same-sex marriages.”43 Assuming that his beliefs on this 
matter are sincere, it is clear that compelling him to use his artistic skills to create wedding 
cakes for same-sex couples compels him to violate what he takes to be a mandate of his 
religion. As Christianity is a core doctrine which plays a central role within his ongoing 
endeavors, CADA burdens his personal integrity by undermining his ability to successfully 
pursue a project which is central to his identity. In other words, the law compelling him to serve 
same-sex couples undermines his ability to live out his convictions as a Christian. 
 I take this first way in which public accommodation laws can burden the personal 
integrity of wedding vendors to be relatively uncontroversial. If personal integrity involves 
                                                           
42 Loren E. Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 26. 
43 Craig, 370 P.3d at 277. 
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being true to one’s beliefs and there is a law which compels individuals to do something in 
direct violation of what they believe to be a religious obligation, then such a law undermines 
their integrity by circumventing their ability to live a life fully consonant with their religious 
identity. The second way, however, is more controversial and it involves the claim that 
compelling certain wedding vendors to serve same-sex couples is, in effect, compelling them to 
express a message which they disagree with. In arguing for this claim, I draw significantly from 
the Supreme Court’s free speech jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has historically recognized 
that the First Amendment protects a speaker’s “autonomy to choose the content of his own 
message and, conversely, to decide what not to say”44 and that no citizen should be compelled 
to express by word or act any particular opinion which they disagree with.45 CADA both 
undermines Phillips’ autonomy as a speaker and compels him to express a particular opinion 
which he finds disagreeable. 
 Courts have generally rejected the argument that wedding vendors are compelled to 
express a message when they are forced to comply with public accommodation laws.46 In 
rejecting this argument, courts often insist that treating same-sex couples on a par with 
opposite-sex couples is not inherently expressive conduct, does not express a message of 
approval for same-sex marriage and is merely showing compliance with operative anti-
discrimination laws. I maintain that this conclusion is incorrect regarding Masterpiece 
Cakeshop. I further claim that the compelled conduct at play in Masterpiece Cakeshop – 
designing and creating wedding cakes for same-sex couples – expresses a particular message 
                                                           
44 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 558 (1995). Also, see Riley v. 
National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, 487 U.S. 781, 796-797 (1988). 
45 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
46 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 53 and Craig, 370 P.3d at 277. 
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which Phillips does not endorse. This burdens his integrity by divorcing his personal convictions 
from the content of his expression. Alternatively, it requires him to “dis-integrate [his] creativity 
and [his] conscience.”47 
 In beginning this inquiry into whether the regulated conduct is deserving of First 
Amendment protections, courts have had to ascertain whether the conduct is expressive. While 
the text of the First Amendment extends protection to ‘speech’ only, courts have “long 
recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word.”48 In other words, 
courts have interpreted the Free Speech clause to protect conduct which constitutes expression 
of ideas. A working definition of these acts of expression has been provided by Thomas Scanlon 
when he wrote that “any act that is intended by its agent to communicate to one or more 
persons some proposition or attitude” can be considered an act of expression.49 
 The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the view “that an apparently limitless variety 
of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends 
thereby to express an idea.”50 Instead, the Court has opted to extend First Amendment 
protection only to conduct which is deemed ‘inherently expressive.’51 In Spence v. Washington, 
the Court developed a test to discern when conduct ought to be deemed ‘inherently 
expressive.’ I adopt this test because I believe that it provides us with a judicable framework. 
There are two prongs to the test the Court developed. First, the speaker must have intended to 
send a particularized message by the conduct. Second, the audience must have understood the 
                                                           
47 Richard Garnett, Symposium: Conscience, conditions, and access to civil society, SCOTUSblog (Sep. 15, 2017, 4:50 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/09/symposium-conscience-conditions-access-civil-society/. 
48 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). 
49 Thomas Scanlon, “A Theory of Freedom of Expression,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 (1972): 206. 
50 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
51 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006). 
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message being sent.52 The test was restated in Texas v. Johnson as requiring that an “intent to 
convey a particularized message was present” and “the likelihood was great that the message 
would be understood by those who viewed it.”53 
 Considering the first prong, it is not clear how particular the intended message must be. 
The Court has stated that “a narrow succinctly articulable message is not a condition of 
constitutional protection” as such an interpretation would not reach “the unquestionably 
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of 
Lewis Carroll.”54 Other than insisting that the ‘particularized message’ requirement should not 
be interpreted too narrowly, the Court has said little else regarding how it should be positively 
interpreted. There is likely no clear and uncontroversial line to be drawn between messages 
which are ‘particular’ and messages which are too general to warrant First Amendment 
protections under this test. What I propose is that the first prong of the test can and should be 
understood in light of the second. To reiterate, the second prong is that the audience 
understood the message being intentionally communicated by the conduct in question. We can 
understand the content of the message conveyed by analyzing what likely message would be 
understood by the audience who viewed it. If it is determined that there is a likely message 
which would be understood by those who viewed it, the conduct should be deemed inherently 
expressive. 
 Carolina Corbin has defended a similar understanding of the test set forth in Spence. She 
has argued that courts should try to decipher whether particular conduct has what she called a 
                                                           
52 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
53 Texas, 491 U.S.at 404. 
54 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. 
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‘social meaning.’ ‘Social meaning,’ according to Corbin, is “the meaning society attaches to 
particular conduct in a particular time and place.”55 In analyzing Masterpiece Cakeshop, we 
have to analyze whether a wedding cake, or, more specifically, whether the process of creating 
one for a specific couple, has a meaning that is understood by society in the current 
contemporary context. I maintain that it does and that compelling Phillips to design and create 
wedding cakes for same-sex couples compels him to express a message which is contrary to his 
religious convictions. 
 Most of the courts and legal scholars commenting on this case and others like it argue 
that the message being expressed by the act of making a wedding cake and of providing goods 
or services to same-sex weddings more generally, if there is one, is approval of same-sex 
marriage. Thus, proponents of exemptions have argued that compelling wedding vendors with 
religious objections to same-sex marriage amounts to compelling them to express an approval 
of same-sex marriage. Opponents of exemptions, on the other hand, deny that serving same-
sex couples involves expressing such a message. 
 Opponents of exemptions are correct to deny that serving same-sex couples involves 
expressing a message of approval for same-sex marriage but they are incorrect in the assertion 
that it involves no expression at all. This is because they are incorrect regarding the actual social 
meaning underlying the production and sale of certain products or services to same-sex couples 
planning wedding celebrations. The actual social meaning and, thus, the message being 
expressed by the conduct is the recognition that same-sex marriages are, in fact, marriages. I 
will now turn to the specific arguments as they relate to the design and sale of wedding cakes. 
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 Masterpiece Cakeshop and Phillips argue that the sale of wedding cakes to same-sex 
couples expresses a message of approval for same-sex marriage. Those opposing Masterpiece 
Cakeshop’s claim correctly point out that “the business context essentially neutralizes any 
potential message of endorsement” for same-sex marriage.56 In other words, during the normal 
course of business, reasonable observers of business transactions would likely not come to the 
conclusion that the mere act of selling a product or service expressed a message of approval on 
the part of the business for either the customer purchasing it, the event it is being purchased 
for or the conduct taking place at the event. In fact, it seems likely that many businesses are 
regularly unaware of the details regarding the particular events they provide goods or services 
for. 
What I claim, however, is that a message of approval is not the message which would be 
likely understood by those who observed the conduct of custom-making a wedding cake. That 
is, a message of approval is not the social meaning of the design, creation and sale of a custom-
made wedding cake to a same-sex couple. This is because the business transaction includes a 
unique creative dimension (namely the fact that the cake is custom-made for a specific couple) 
and involves the creation of a symbolic product. When Phillips begins the process of creating a 
wedding cake, he has an in-depth “consultation with the customer(s) in order to get to know 
their desires, their personalities, their personal preferences and learn about their wedding 
ceremony and celebration.”57 Furthermore, Phillips considers himself an artist and custom-
makes all of his wedding cakes. He determines the design of the cake through his consultation 
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with the customer(s) and then uses his artistic talents to sculpt what can be called a ‘temporary 
sculpture’ which will serve as a central component of the wedding celebration. A wedding cake 
is not merely a dessert and its purpose is not merely to fulfill the guests’ appetites after the 
main meal.58 It is a symbolic representation meant to communicate a celebratory message.59 As 
was written in the petition for the Supreme Court to accept the case, a couple slicing a wedding 
cake plays a communicative role in signifying that the couple is now married, “slicing a pizza or 
a pot roast would not have the same effect.”60 
 Not only do wedding cakes play a communicative role at the celebration, but weddings 
are inherently expressive events. Echoing some points made in the Obergefell opinion by 
Justice Kennedy, Helen Alvare wrote that 
marital “status” is the legal and social recognition that the marital union is specially 
favored because it forms the “keystone of the social order,” is the most favorable and 
stable place for sexual expression and childrearing, and is a public sign of fidelity, 
permanence, maturity and social responsibility. It is because state-recognized marriage 
                                                           
58 Justice Sotomayor, in oral arguments for Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, stated that 
“the primary purpose of a food of any kind is to be eaten” and that “some people might love the aesthetic appeal 
of a special dessert, and look at it for a very long time, but in the end its only purpose is to be eaten.” See 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-15, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, (No. 16-111). It 
should be mentioned from the outset that she is stating two different things here. Stating that the primary 
purpose of any kind of food is to be eaten is different from stating that is its only purpose. We can probably grant 
that she was just being a little careless with her language and concede that her ultimate point is that the primary 
purpose of any kind of food is not to express a particular message but to be eaten. There are a couple of points 
with which I would like to respond. First, I am not sure why, even if we should grant her point that expressing a 
message is not the primary purpose of a wedding cake, that expressing a message could not be some secondary 
purpose. Also, I just think her point here is mistaken. It is simply not the primary purpose of a wedding cake to be 
eaten and just because it can be eaten does not mean that is its primary purpose. Second, Sotomayor would have 
to reconcile her claim with the fact that faux wedding cakes have been a trend for quite a while. Some customers 
wish to have the aesthetic of a traditional wedding cake but, to save money, have purchased faux cakes which are 
decorated and have designs like ‘real’ wedding cakes but are generally made out of some inedible substance like 
Styrofoam. This gives us a prima facie reason to think that at least some couples do not believe that being edible is 
a prerequisite for wedding cake to fulfill its primary purpose but rather believe that its purpose is to serve an 
aesthetic role at the wedding celebration. 
59 For a discussion on the historical symbolism of wedding cakes, see Haley Holik, “You Have the Right to Speak by 
Remaining Silent: Why a State Sanction to Create a Wedding Cake is Compelled Speech,” Regent University Law 
Review 28 (2015): 302-304. 
60 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission (No. 16-111).  
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legally possesses and communicated such a status that over a thousand state benefits 
flow to it, and myriad obligations attach to it as well.61 
 
Alvare went on to say that “state-sanctioned same-sex marriage communicates the perfect 
equality of same- and opposite-sex married unions.”62 It is precisely because marital status 
communicates these messages that marriage equality for same-sex couples is desirable and, 
according to Kennedy, required by the Constitution. Because wedding cakes communicate a 
celebratory message about the marriage, they also communicate an implicit celebratory 
message about the messages which the marital status itself communicates. 
 Where proponents of exemptions have faltered in their arguments is when they insist 
that the celebratory message communicated by wedding cakes can be easily attributed to the 
baker who made the cake. It is possible that, in preparing wedding cakes for engaged couples, 
Phillips is happy for the couple, approving of their union and may even feel joy on behalf of 
them. But it is not at all clear that a reasonable observer would likely interpret his conduct in 
this way or even that his other customers would. For instance, consider a high-class baker in 
Manhattan who exclusively creates custom-made cakes. When a customer asks him to create 
an extravagant birthday cake, are we to believe that, in making the cake, he is thereby 
expressing a celebratory message to the individual who is ultimately going to receive it? 
Consider another example brought up in oral arguments for Masterpiece Cakeshop. If a 
husband bought a cake which contained the text ‘I’m Sorry,’ would the baker then take 
responsibility for the apologetic message being communicated.63 What should we think that the 
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baker has to apologize for? It seems unlikely that reasonable observers would come to the 
conclusion that the baker automatically adopts the celebratory or apologetic message just 
because such a message was expressed by a product he created and sold. 
 But the social meaning behind a baker like Phillips sitting down with a couple, discussing 
their aesthetic and culinary preferences, what type of wedding they are having and then using 
his artistic talents to design and creating a wedding cake specifically customized for them is not 
one of approval but of recognition. That is, by doing all of this, he is expressing the message 
that he recognizes the event he is making the wedding cake for as a bona fide wedding. In other 
words, the message he would be expressing is “that a wedding has occurred, a marriage has 
begun and the couple should be celebrated.”64 Reasonable observers who are aware of the 
process that Phillips undergoes when he begins the process of creating a wedding cake would 
likely come to the conclusion that, if he started the process of creating a cake for a same-sex 
wedding, that he recognized it as an actual wedding. This recognition is the message he is being 
compelled to express by Colorado’s public accommodation law and it is one with which he 
disagrees.  
The reason expressing this message is so unconscionable and disagreeable to Phillips 
and others is that, while federal and state governments are now required by law to recognize 
same-sex marriages, many Christians do not believe that such marriages are legitimate. Indeed, 
they believe that marriage is a sacred gift to humanity from God and is meant to only be 
between one man and one woman. Many of them do not believe that same-sex marriages are 
condoned by God and, thus, do not believe that same-sex marriages are ‘real’ marriages. This 
                                                           
64 Reply in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission (No. 16-111). 
30 
 
belief does not have to only rely on Biblical authority. For example, the official position of the 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops is that “relationships between two persons of the 
same sex are not, and can never be, marriages.”65 But compelling Phillips to create a custom-
made wedding cake for a same-sex wedding is compelling him to express to the world that he 
recognizes them as such. Just as a baker preparing a custom-made birthday cake expresses the 
message that he is creating the cake for an actual birthday, a baker like Phillips, who only 
creates custom-made wedding cakes, expresses the message that he judges same-sex weddings 
to be bona fide weddings once he begins the process of creating a wedding cake for a same-sex 
couple. 
 With all of this being said, one could still remain skeptical that the conduct of creating a 
wedding cake, even a customized one for a particular couple, rises to the level of genuinely 
expressive conduct. It might still be claimed that the message of recognition is subsumed by the 
commercial context in which it is purportedly expressed. That is, it is open for opponents of 
exemptions in these cases to argue that reasonable observers would likely not see the design 
and sale of wedding cakes as a message of recognition but rather as mere compliance with 
public accommodation laws. I will offer a brief rejoinder to this line of argument which concerns 
the contemporary social context. At the time of writing this paper, it has been about three 
years since marriage equality was granted to same-sex couples in Obergefell. Since then, the 
ruling and its consequences have been much discussed in mainstream and academic literature. 
Although I believe that the ruling in Obergefell was positive, there remains a significant portion 
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of American citizens who believe that unions between members of the same-sex are immoral. 
Furthermore, public accommodation laws like the ones implicated in New Mexico and Colorado 
are not in place in all parts of the country. An idealized ‘reasonable person,’ much less the 
average citizen, should not be assumed to recognize that a business providing goods or services 
for same-sex weddings is merely complying with extant anti-discrimination laws as the laws 
themselves are inconsistent in their application.  
In short, what I maintain is that there are two social conditions which give credence to 
the idea that a reasonable observer would likely see a business providing a customized good for 
a same-sex wedding as recognition of that wedding: the fact that same-sex marriages are still 
objectionable to a significant minority of citizens and the fact that anti-discrimination provisions 
are inconsistently applied across jurisdictions. Stories about businesses refusing to facilitate 
same-sex wedding ceremonies have become popular in the news media so it is likely that 
citizens who observe businesses not doing that believe that such businesses recognize the 
legitimacy of same-sex marriages. This is bolstered by the fact that current anti-discrimination 
protections for the LGBTQ community are currently represented by a patchwork of provisions 
rather than a consistent scheme. As stated earlier, it cannot merely be assumed that a business 
providing goods or services for same-sex weddings is merely complying with public 
accommodation laws because there are many areas in the United States where that is not what 
the law actually requires.  
It may seem paradoxical that the inconsistency of anti-discrimination laws would 
provide a reason for certain businesses to be exempt from them.66 However, I maintain that 
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this inconsistency in conjunction with the fact that a significant minority of citizens still vocally 
object to same-sex marriage reflects the current state of the debate. If a vocal minority 
disagreed with the institution of same-sex marriage yet the federal law prohibited all 
businesses from refusing service on the basis of sexual orientation (so the federal law just 
extended the set of protected characteristics), it may be that reasonable observers would 
interpret Phillips conduct as merely following the law. But the fact that sexual orientation is not 
a protected characteristic reflects the current debate in the legal literature. That is, scholars are 
still debating whether sexual orientation should be a protected characteristic. In addition, there 
is an ongoing policy debate regarding the appropriate scope of anti-discrimination laws. Thus, it 
is not merely that public accommodation laws are inconsistent which gives us a reason to 
exempt certain businesses but that this inconsistency reflects the fact that there is a live public 
debate regarding the validity of same-sex marriage as an institution as well as the place of 
sexual orientation in anti-discrimination law. Compelling businesses to express a message of 
recognition is compelling them to express that they have a particular opinion in the ongoing 
disputes about the legitimacy of same-sex marriage when they do not (or even when they have 
hold an opposing opinion). This is a straightforward violation of their freedom of expression. 
Thus, a message of recognition is the social meaning attached to Phillips’ conduct and it 
is a message he disagrees with. CADA compels him to design and create wedding cakes for 
same-sex couples if he does so for opposite-sex couples and this has the effect of undermining 
his ability both as a speaker and as an artist to autonomously choose the expressive content of 
his artistry. It also burdens his integrity by divorcing the expressive content of his artistic 
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process from his personal identity and from his goal of creating artwork the expression of which 
is consistent with Christian principles. 
 Thus far, I have argued that there are two related ways in which public accommodation 
laws burden the integrity of religious wedding vendors. The first is that the vendors may believe 
that facilitating same-sex marriages in any way, even by merely providing goods or services to 
same-sex couples, is a violation of their religious conscience and the law compels them to be so 
violative. I spent relatively little time arguing for this claim as I believe it is rather 
uncontroversial. If a central project of mine is to live according to the tenets of a particular 
religion and a law compels me to violate those tenets, then the law burdens my integrity by 
undermining my ability to pursue that project. This is essentially analogous to the facts of 
Masterpiece Cakeshop. 
 The second way in which public accommodation laws can potentially burden the 
integrity of wedding vendors is by compelling creative wedding vendors to engage in expressive 
conduct which expresses a message they do not believe. CADA does this in the case of 
Masterpiece Cakeshop by compelling Phillips to express a message of recognition for same-sex 
marriages. However, even if the law is a burden to Phillips’ personal integrity, the question 
remains whether that burden is substantial or unique. Vallier’s definition of substantial burdens 
as significant setbacks to one’s capacity to advance one’s interests is not particularly insightful 
as it requires us to further ask what we mean by a setback being ‘significant.’ This is not a fault 
in Vallier’s framework as an answer to the question of whether a burden is substantial or 
significant would most likely depend on a case-by-case analysis. It is also a question courts have 
to deal with on a regular basis – particularly in cases having to do with religious liberty claims. 
34 
 
 There are a couple of methods by which courts and legislators can determine whether a 
burden is substantial. The first is to look at the theological or religious substantiality of the 
burden. The second is to assess the substantiality of the civil penalties triggered by one’s 
religious exercise.67 While there are legal reasons to prefer one method over the other, we do 
not need to choose just one as a conjunctive analysis will allow us to see if a burden is 
substantial in the full sense of the term. Furthermore, I maintain that public accommodation 
laws do substantially burden certain wedding vendors according to this conjunctive analysis. 
 There are perhaps legal and prudential reasons why courts should avoid doing an 
analysis into the theological or religious substantiality of burdens imposed by secular laws. For 
one, such an analysis would raise Establishment Clause concerns as some theories of the 
Establishment Clause forbid courts from looking into the theology of any particular religion 
while adjudicating cases.68 Even if such analyses did not raise any constitutional questions, 
courts are not in a good position to do any type of theological analysis. Simply put, judges and 
jurists are not trained to delve into matters of theology or religious studies. Undertaking an 
analysis into the theology of a specific religion may also cause courts to favor more popular and 
mainstream religions as they are the most familiar. This would put minority religions at a 
disadvantage in the courts.69 In addition to the theological or religious burdens, there is also the 
question of how substantial the civil penalties triggered by religious exercise are. This could be 
measured financially, by the amount of jail or prison time or by the substantiality of any other 
penalty incurred. 
                                                           
67 Michael A. Helfand, “Identifying Substantial Burdens,” University of Illinois Law Review (2016). 
68 Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) and Hernandez v. 
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680,699 (1989). 
69 There is empirical backing to this worry. See Gregory C. Sisk and Michael Heise, “Muslims and Religious Liberty in 
the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts,” Iowa Law Review 98 (2012). 
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 Regarding the religious substantiality of the burden, there is good reason to give a 
significant amount of deference to the individual being purportedly burdened in analyzing 
whether a burden is substantial. As already stated, courts are not in a good position to judge 
the theological merit of specific claims. It is also not the case that courts should refer to the 
official doctrines of a particular sect as an authority and hold these doctrines as central to every 
practicing member of that sect. For instance, it is possible for a sect to recognize same-sex 
marriages but for a member of that sect to have a different interpretation of the Bible and to 
believe that same-sex marriage is sinful. Courts and legislators should not enforce modes of 
orthodoxy by concluding that a burden is substantial only if the burden is related to a central 
theological or religious doctrine of an established sect. 
 Given that we ought to give deference to what individuals perceive as central to their 
religion in analyzing the religious substantiality of a particular burden, there is good reason to 
believe that public accommodation laws do impose a substantial burden to the integrity of 
religious wedding vendors.70 Such vendors often have to make a choice between following the 
dictates of their conscience and following the law. Alternatively, they could make the decision 
to get out of the business altogether. But this both undermines their projects – if such projects 
include running a business in line with their religious commitments – and potentially has 
                                                           
70 In a Supreme Court case in 2014, Justice Ginsburg pushed back against the view that we should give a great 
amount of deference to religious believers when adjudicating religious liberty claims. She argued that the Court 
basically ignored “the distinction between the sincerity of a challenger’s religious belief and the substantiality of 
the burden placed on the challenger.” See Burwell 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (2014) (Justice Ginsburg dissenting). This is 
one reason why I favor a conjunctive analysis as it does not fall into the potential trap of relying solely on the 
subjective feeling of the religious believer regarding whether a burden is substantial or not. 
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significant financial costs.71 The civil penalties imposed on wedding vendors for being found in 
violation of public accommodation laws is also often pretty substantial, sometimes resulting in 
fines up to $10,000.72 
 The burdens vendors face is also unique because it only applies to vendors with religious 
objections to same-sex marriage. Atheists or other religious believers who do not have such 
objections would not have a similar objection to facilitating same-sex weddings. They would 
therefore not be burdened with the compelled choice between following their perceived 
religious obligations, following the law or giving up on their projects by forfeiting their business. 
Again, if the burden imposed was not unique in this way but was generally applicable, then the 
correct approach would be to work to repeal the law in question unless it was justified by 
overriding state interests. 
§3. Narrowly-Tailored Exemptions and Compelling State Interests 
 In this section, I discuss the remaining conditions to be found in Vallier’s framework. 
Concluding that a burden is substantial and unique is not dispositive of whether an individual 
ought to be granted an exemption. Vallier also stipulated that burdens on one’s integrity may 
be off-set by comparable benefits. There is also the requirement that the exemption does not 
impose significant costs on other parties which require redress. Before I discuss these 
conditions in detail, however, I wish to suggest why the exemptions I defend would be 
narrowly-tailored. This is important because proponents of exemptions often utilize theories of 
exemptions which are too broad. If a scheme of exemptions is too broad, then it is more likely 
                                                           
71 For instance, Phillips had to forego his wedding cake business which was approximately 40% of his business. See 
Reply in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 13, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission (No. 16-111). 
72 Bailey, “Farm owners fined.” 
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that the purposes of public accommodation laws would be undermined by applying it. This, in 
turn, makes it more likely that courts or legislators should reject such a scheme. In defending a 
principle or rule which would separate vendors who deserve exemptions from those who do 
not, it is important to weigh competing interests – that is, the interests of the vendors against 
the interests of same-sex couples or, alternatively, the interests of the vendors against 
competing state interests. 
 This recognition that any scheme of exemptions ought to be narrowly-tailored for the 
explicit purpose of not undermining the goals of anti-discrimination laws is a weakness in 
Vallier’s account. At the very least, it marks his account as potentially incomplete. Vallier 
seemed to be focused on developing a model of when exemptions are warranted in individual 
cases. But when appellate courts, particularly the Supreme Court, analyze cases, they have to 
be aware that they are also developing doctrines and rules that will potentially be applied to 
future cases. It is quite likely that offering one vendor an exemption would have virtually no 
effect on the general purposes of public accommodation laws and would not harm the same-
sex couple being denied service in a tangible way. But courts must be cognizant of when they 
are potentially setting precedent and providing the same exemption to several hundred 
vendors under a developed rule may in fact undermine the purpose of public accommodation 
law. This is why it is important to make sure that any scheme of exemptions is narrowly-
tailored. We should look beyond whether harm or an undermining of existing law is present in 
one particular case and analyze whether such harm would be present if the principle used to 
decide the case was applied universally. 
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 Kristen Waggoner, a lead attorney for Masterpiece Cakeshop, attempted to draw a line 
between wedding vendors who deserve exemptions and those which do not. In response to 
questioning from the justices during oral arguments, she suggested that florists, invitation 
designers and jewelers should be granted exemptions along with Masterpiece Cakeshop but 
that hair stylists, makeup artists, chefs and tailors should not be. This was because, according to 
Waggoner, the latter four are not engaged in speech or expressive conduct.73 Justice Kagan 
presented an unappealing (and I believe inaccurate) representation of Waggoner’s argument 
when she asserted that Waggoner and other defenders of Masterpiece Cakeshop hold the view 
“that a cake can be speech because it involves great skill and artistry.”74 This begs the question 
why hair stylists and makeup artists would not also be engaged in expressive conduct as their 
craft can also involve great skill and artistic merit. As my argument above suggests, however, 
while designing and creating a wedding cake does involve a certain amount of skill and artistry, 
that alone is not sufficient to deem it expressive conduct. It is expressive conduct because it 
involves creativity and artistry on the part of the vendor and because there is a social meaning 
attached to custom-making a wedding cake for a same-sex couple. The question of whether the 
business is creative or artistic should not be seen as dispositive. The business also has to be 
judged to be engaged in inherently expressive conduct according to the tests which the Court 
itself set out. 
 This point introduces the first category of vendors which warrant exemptions – vendors 
whose conduct is deemed as inherently expressive. I concluded earlier that the conduct of 
making a wedding cake is expressive conduct because it is artistic and creative and because 
                                                           
73 Transcript of Oral Argument at 11-14, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, (No. 16-111). 
74 Ibid., 13. 
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neutral observers would likely see Phillip’s process of designing and creating a wedding cake for 
a same-sex couple as recognition that the couple would soon become a legitimately married 
couple. This is in no small part due to the fact that Phillips only provided custom-made wedding 
cakes. If he provided pre-made wedding cakes or if he had a catalog of cakes for customers to 
choose from, then the case may warrant a different conclusion. But we should not say, like 
some commentators have, that “customization marks the line between expression and 
impermissible discrimination.”75 The salient point is not merely that the product is custom-
made but that the process of custom-making the product expresses a particular message. While 
I maintain that this is the case with Masterpiece Cakeshop, it is not the case with all vendors 
who provide customized products or services.  
The set of members of this first category of vendors is somewhat vague – intentionally 
so. Courts and legislators would have to be careful in granting exemptions under this criterion. 
Some of the justices in oral arguments, as well as the solicitors involved, have illustrated 
misunderstandings about what is actually at issue in these types of cases. It is not the creativity 
and artistry of the product or service which triggers free speech concerns but whether the 
creative conduct itself, in the surrounding social context, can be seen as expressing a particular 
message. Furthermore, the message is not one of approval but of recognition. Where this 
category is vague, similar to many other jurisprudentially crafted categories, is at the 
boundaries. Do tailors express recognition of same-sex weddings when they create suits or 
tuxedos? My intuition is that they do not but it might be a different story for a bridal boutique 
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Between the First Amendment and Antidiscrimination Laws,” Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 26 
(2017): 409. 
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which only provides custom-made wedding gowns or a wedding photographer who insists that, 
in taking pictures of weddings, she is thereby telling a celebratory story about the union.76 
Either way, an analysis into social meaning would have to be undertaken in each of these cases 
and it is my view that the amount of wedding vendors who actually belong in this category is 
relatively low – far lower than proponents or opponents of exemptions generally recognize.  
The second category does not have to do with the expression of wedding vendors but in 
their active participation in the celebration or ceremony. Because of this, it has no bearing on 
Masterpiece Cakeshop but should be considered regardless. This category would include those 
vendors who, by providing their services, are active participants in the wedding ceremony. A 
paradigmatic example would be an officiant who offers her services to the public. As stated 
earlier, I believe that there is good reason to give a fair amount of deference to individuals in 
figuring out whether they are substantially burdened relative to their religious obligations. But 
when it comes to analyzing whether substantial burdens warrant exemptions in these types of 
cases, we should be a bit more measured to make sure that the exemptions are not too broad. 
For instance, a restaurant owner might have a religious objection to desegregating their 
restaurants. While the Biblical basis for this is dubious, let us assume that there is a religion 
whose sacred text can be reasonably read as mandating the separate and unequal treatment of 
individuals based on their race. Granting exemptions based on that reasoning to everybody 
who claims to believe such reasons would undermine the purpose of the federal public 
accommodation statute and the anti-discrimination principle expressed in the 14th Amendment. 
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Similarly, we ought not to give every vendor an exemption simply because they believe that 
serving same-sex couples is a violation of their religious commitments. 
The point behind this category is to allow for the narrow-tailoring of a scheme of 
exemptions. As the objections are usually framed as objections to the event – that is, the 
wedding celebration – we should take more seriously the claims of vendors who are compelled 
by law to actively participate in the event. Just like the previous category, this category is vague 
at the boundaries and would have to be worked out in practice. For instance, a band hired to 
perform at a wedding can be said to be participating at the event by providing entertainment 
but it is not entirely clear whether a caterer is participating by providing the meal or whether a 
property owner is participating by providing the venue. As is the case with the first category, I 
expect that this category would be quite narrower than some defenders of exemptions suggest. 
For instance, if all one does is rent out a property that one owns, I do not think it makes much 
sense to say that he is thereby a participant in the ceremony as it is unlikely that most people 
attending would even be aware of his or her existence.  
Although this category is vague, there are two rough-and-ready rules to determine 
when a vendor is not an active participant in a wedding ceremony or celebration. First, if the 
vendor is not present at the ceremony, there is no sense in which he or she is participating in it. 
This excludes quite a bit of retail stores who claim that facilitating same-sex marriages is a 
violation of their free exercise of religion. Due to the large amount of religious doctrines, their 
beliefs on this issue may very well be sincere but we should not allow exemptions to every 
retail store who claims to have a religious objection to same-sex marriage. Second, if it is likely 
that attendees would never see you or notice your presence at the ceremony, it is equally likely 
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that you are not participating in the ceremony. This excludes certain employees at venues, 
property managers or any businesses or staff whose job may involve them working in 
conjunction with the ceremony taking place but cannot be properly said to be participating in 
it. 
3.1. Compelling State Interests 
Earlier in the paper, I noted the purposes underlying public accommodation laws and I 
will repeat them here. They are: 1) to ensure and maintain equal access to publicly available 
goods and services, 2) to eradicate barriers to the equal treatment of all citizens in the public 
marketplace, 3) to maintain the social order, 4) to stigmatize the practice of discrimination in 
the public marketplace and 5) to prevent dignitary harms. I assume going forward that the 
government has an interest in fulfilling these purposes and I will also assume for the sake of 
argument that the government’s interest in fulfilling these purposes is compelling. My 
argument is that applying public accommodation laws to the vendors in the above two 
categories is not necessary in order to achieve them.  
The first purpose is to maintain equal access to publicly available goods and services. 
The concept ‘equal access’ includes two further concepts which need to be explicated. First is 
the issue of ‘access.’ It is undisputed that the couple who was refused service by Masterpiece 
Cakeshop received a rainbow themed wedding cake free of charge from another baker. Thus, 
access to wedding cakes was not a problem in this case. The same goes for many of these types 
of cases. There are a large amount of various types of wedding vendors available and, if the 
sample size of these cases is any indicator, same-sex couples generally do not have any 
significant trouble finding a similar business if they are refused service by one. This suggests 
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that access is not typically undermined by vendors refusing service on the basis of religious 
objections to same-sex marriage. If access to goods or services would be prevented by granting 
an exemption, then that should give judges and legislators pause before granting such an 
exemption. 
 As many have pointed out in these cases, however, the interest the government has in 
maintaining equal access is about more than the mere good or service which is being accessed. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop is about more than access to wedding cake just like anti-discrimination 
cases in the civil rights era were about more than access to burgers. This brings us to the 
second interest which the state has: eradicating barriers to the equal treatment of minorities in 
the public marketplace. The concept of equality presents difficulties, however, as such a 
concept could warrant different descriptive and normative descriptions depending on one’s 
perspective. One might describe the conduct of Phillips as treating all of his customers equally 
as he would not sell any person, regardless of sexual orientation, products or services which 
involve him expressing recognition of the legitimacy of same-sex marriage. On the other hand, 
it is reasonable to interpret his conduct as treating same-sex couples unequally as he generally 
designs and creates wedding cakes for opposite-sex couples whenever he is requested to. In 
that sense, he is treating same-sex couples unequally.  
Although both views are plausible, I adopt the former view and propose that the type of 
unequal treatment that the government should be cognizant of are businesses refusing service 
solely on the basis of protected characteristics. Vendors who fall in either of the two categories 
I set out are not refusing service based solely on a protected characteristic. Rather, they are 
refusing service either because they do not want to participate in conduct they find 
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objectionable or they do not want to be compelled to express a message that they recognize 
such conduct as valid or legitimate. 
 To be sure, courts have rejected this type of conduct/identity distinction before. When 
vendors argue that they are not discriminating on the basis of a protected characteristic (in this 
case, sexual orientation) but are refusing service because they do not wish to associate 
themselves with certain conduct (i.e., a same-sex wedding), courts have replied that the 
conduct is so intertwined with the identity of the individual that they are effectively 
discriminating on the basis of one’s identity. This relies on a particular understanding of when a 
business can be said to be discriminating against somebody because of a protected 
characteristic. Courts hearing these cases have generally maintained that, for a business to 
discriminate against an individual because of a protected characteristic means that, but for the 
fact that they have this particular characteristic, they would not have been refused service. 
Because same-sex marriage is so tied into one’s sexual orientation, but for the fact that these 
couples are gay, they would not have been denied service. 
I am willing to concede that this is the appropriate way to analyze whether conduct is 
discriminatory. This is why I reject arguments to the effect that Masterpiece Cakeshop is not 
discriminating against same-sex couples when Phillips refuses to provide them with wedding 
cakes. But to the question of whether providing narrowly-tailored exemptions would 
undermine the compelling state interest in maintaining equal treatment, the answer is no. For 
instance, Masterpiece Cakeshop would similarly refuse to sell a wedding cake to a heterosexual 
individual if he knew that it was going to go to a same-sex wedding. To make this example seem 
more plausible, consider a same-sex couple who enlists a family member or friend to purchase 
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a wedding cake for their wedding. The friend goes to a baker and, during the exchange, the 
baker figures out that he is being requested to design a cake for a same-sex wedding. Because 
of this, he declines to make one. This would seem to be a perfectly legal thing for the baker to 
do considering the general language of public accommodation statutes which typically states 
that businesses cannot refuse service based on the sexual orientation of the customer. But if it 
is not the customer’s sexual orientation the baker objects to but rather the message attached 
to creating a wedding cake for such an event or the fact that he is being asked to participate in 
the event, it ceases to be unequal treatment based solely on one’s sexual orientation. Such an 
example gives credence to the idea that the conduct/identity distinction is not as much of an 
error as courts make it appear. Because businesses can generally refuse to provide goods or 
services which involve them expressing a disagreeable message or which involves them 
participating in a religious ceremony which they would rather not participate in, these vendors 
are not treating same-sex couples unequally by refusing to provide goods or services for same-
sex weddings.  
The third governmental interest is maintaining the social order. Terri Day and Danielle 
Weatherby argued that allowing businesses to discriminate in the area of public 
accommodations has measurable, adverse economic effects. This is also one of the arguments 
that the Colorado Court of Appeals referred to in their opinion denying Masterpiece Cakeshop’s 
claim. I allow for the fact that even a narrowly-tailored scheme of exemptions may have 
significantly adverse economic effects and may even undermine the social order. Such an 
argument would have to be backed up by empirical data, however. The Court of Appeals as well 
as Day and Weatherby, in making this argument, appealed to a report published by the 
46 
 
Michigan Department of Civil Rights. The fault with their line of argument is that the report 
does not show what they purport it to show. The report does detail adverse economic and 
societal effects due to a lack of anti-discrimination laws but, at the time, Michigan lacked any 
adequate scheme of anti-discrimination regulations for the LGBTQ community, including in the 
areas of employment and housing. In fact, the report explicitly states that its primary focus was 
on “data related to employment protections.”77 As such, the primary focus of the report is not 
on data related to discrimination in the realm of public accommodations which is what this case 
is about.  
The fourth purpose is to stigmatize the practice of unjust discrimination. Andrew 
Koppelman argues convincingly that the antidiscrimination project is fundamentally a project of 
cultural transformation.78 The ordinary status quo is that businesses can refuse service for any 
reason that they wish. The federal public accommodation law was primarily enacted in order to 
protect black Americans from being excluded from broad swaths of the marketplace due only 
to the color of their skin. According to Koppelman, while the federal civil rights act had several 
subsidiary purposes, its primary function was to rid society of the evils of structural racism. This 
involved an attempt to transform the culture which is to say that one purpose of anti-
discrimination laws was to rid people of racist beliefs and attitudes. Accordingly, public 
accommodation statutes which include sexual orientation as a protected class are meant to rid 
people of bigoted beliefs regarding homosexuals.  
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Yale University Press, 1996). 
47 
 
 As Koppelman points out, however, the project of cultural transformation is directly at 
odds with a proposition that many liberals would readily assent to. That is, “part of what 
defines a free society is that it is none of the government’s business what citizens believe and 
that the shaping of citizens’ beliefs is not a legitimate task of a liberal state” is directly opposed 
to the idea that “racism, sexism, and similar ideologies are so evil and destructive of the proper 
workings of a free society that the state should do whatever it can to eradicate them.”79 
Working out a solution to this supposed conflict is beyond the scope of this paper so let us 
assume for the moment that it is a legitimate task of a liberal state to try to stamp out certain 
illiberal ideologies such as racism, sexism, bigotry, etc. The question then would be whether 
granting narrowly-tailored exemptions to wedding vendors would undermine that task. 
 One part of the cultural transformation project that is implicit in developing a scheme of 
anti-discrimination regulations is the stigmatization of unjust discrimination. This is generally 
done through a form of sanction. That is, if businesses are found to be guilty of violating a 
public accommodation statute, they are liable to be fined or sued by the government or would-
be customers. Alternatively, citizens might protest the business or stop going altogether. One 
solution in these types of cases, according to Koppelman, is that wedding vendors “should be 
exempted, but only if they are willing to bear the cost of publicly identifying themselves as 
discriminatory.” In effect, this “will make discrimination rare almost everywhere.”80 This can be 
seen as a form of sanction as it is likely that businesses publicly identifying as discriminatory 
against same-sex couples would receive a large amount of backlash from their community and 
throughout the country. This is, however, an empirical matter and whether it is true would 
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have to be discovered after some exemptions were put in place. If it is not true that such 
businesses would receive sanction or stigma from the larger community, then that may give us 
good reason to reconsider applying the scheme of exemptions I defend. 
One reason to think that businesses who ‘out themselves’ as discriminatory would 
receive societal backlash is the cultural shift which has taken place regarding attitudes toward 
same-sex unions and homosexuality more generally. According to the Pew Research Center, 
support for same-sex marriage has been steadily growing over the last decade. For instance, in 
2010, 48% of Americans opposed the legalization of gay marriage. Seven years later, 62% of all 
Americans supported same-sex marriage. Support for same-sex marriage also significantly rises 
among younger generations with 74% of Millennials (individuals born after 1980) being 
supportive.81 If this trend holds, a large majority of Americans will support same-sex marriage in 
the next 10-20 years. 
The reason this data is relevant is because whether granting exemptions would 
undermine the ability of the state to stigmatize unjust discrimination depends in large part on 
the pervasiveness of discriminatory attitudes. For instance, if exemptions were allowed in the 
civil rights era for business owners who were willing to post signs reading ‘We Don’t Serve 
Blacks Here,’ it is arguable that there would be very little stigma associated with it. Similarly, in 
an area of the country which is home to a particularly large amount of anti-gay prejudice, 
posting a sign notifying the public that they do not serve same-sex couples would likely not 
receive much pushback or outcry (at least not from the local community). But attitudes are 
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changing and most people now look upon same-sex marriages in a favorable light. Additionally, 
there has recently been a large amount of public outcry whenever legislators attempt to carve 
out exemptions for business owners either in the language of anti-discrimination law or in 
separate religious freedom statutes. This coupled with the prediction that only a small 
percentage of business owners would likely risk the financial and reputational costs associated 
with making one’s discriminatory practices public, the amount of wedding vendors who would 
be effectively granted exemptions would be quite low indeed and would not substantially affect 
the state’s ability to stigmatize discriminatory attitudes or undermine the cultural shift which is 
already taking place. As stated earlier, however, this is an empirical claim and if it could be 
shown that these narrow exemptions were taken advantage of by more businesses than 
originally thought, and that cultural attitudes started to shift back in conjunction with them, 
there would be a stronger case against granting any exemptions. 
The final purpose of public accommodation laws is to prevent the dignitary harm which 
accompanies unequal treatment in the public marketplace. While I assumed earlier that all of 
the purposes I have been discussing are legitimate and compelling state interests, there is a fair 
amount of controversy regarding the place of dignitary harms. For instance, Koppelman claimed 
that “the dignitary harm of knowing that some of your fellow citizens condemn your way of life 
is not one from which the law can or should protect you in a regime of free speech.”82 Vallier 
also insisted that a notion of harm which includes denials of service “may be sectarian, and 
therefore not a suitable basis for law.”83 According to Vallier, “on more traditional liberal views, 
a denial of service will not count as harmful because, in nearly all of the relevant cases, gay and 
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lesbian couples have dozens of affordable alternative venues to purchase wedding cakes.”84 
Particularly in public justification models, a sectarian notion of harm is thought to be unsuitable 
as a basis for law as it is not a notion that everybody can reasonably accept. However, just 
because the traditional concept of harm which Vallier relies on is ‘traditional’ does not make it 
any less sectarian. In addition we should acknowledge that dignity harms are referred to as 
‘harms’ for a reason. I propose to conceive of dignitary harms as a specific type of harm which 
occurs when the government does not protect from invidious discrimination against individuals 
due solely to certain identity characteristics. This type of discrimination undermines the social 
bases of self-respect which in turn undermines the capacity or ability of individuals to be fully 
autonomous agents. I believe that the government does indeed have an interest in preventing 
such harms but that the government does not need to categorically apply public 
accommodation laws in order to fulfill it. 
In order to cash out this claim, I require a notion of autonomy which is relatively 
uncontroversial but which captures the central idea behind most liberal conceptions of what it 
means for somebody to be an autonomous agent. There are many formulations of autonomy 
which are sufficient for this purpose. These can include formulations such as “the ability to 
reflect on the adequacy of one’s own moral reasons, and to distinguish one’s own reasons from 
the reasons of others,”85 “an ideal of people deciding for themselves what is a valuable life, and 
living their lives in accordance with that decision,”86 and “the real and effective capacity to 
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develop and pursue one’s own conception of a worthwhile life.”87 I propose to use a synthesis 
of these options to formulate the minimalistic conception of personal autonomy I have in mind.  
First, to be a fully autonomous agent, one must have the capacity or ability to develop 
and pursue a conception of the good life in accordance with what one thinks is valuable. It is 
important for full autonomy that an agent is able to both develop a conception of the good life 
and actively pursue it. For instance, if an agent was able to develop a particular conception of 
the good life, becoming a doctor say, but was prevented from going to medical school due to 
coercive government policies, her autonomy would be undermined. It is also important for the 
autonomous agent that her conception of the good life be influenced by reasons which are 
truly her own and not unduly influenced by debilitating social conditions or by the wills of 
others. No doubt this conception of personal autonomy is incomplete and unsatisfactory as a 
theory of autonomy but it is enough to illustrate how pervasive discrimination against a 
particular group of people can undermine these conditions of what being an autonomous agent 
requires. 
 Once again, dignitary harms undermine autonomy by undermining the social bases of 
self-respect. This notion of respect is similar to the conception of respect referred to by 
Stephen Darwall as recognition respect.88 Recognition respect consists “in giving appropriate 
consideration or recognition to some feature of its object in deliberating about what to do.”89 
According to Darwall, recognition respect is owed to all persons simply in virtue of the fact that 
they are persons. As such, persons “are entitled to have other persons take seriously and weigh 
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appropriately the fact that they are persons in deliberating about what to do.”90 This extends to 
one’s projects and ends. Since projects are constitutive of our identities, having respect for 
persons entails that we consider their projects and ends seriously in our deliberations. 
To have self-respect, then, is to recognize that one’s own projects and ends are 
valuable, worth pursuing and should a play a role in our practical deliberations. Having respect 
for oneself involves having a sense that one is a person whose projects and ends are valuable 
and that one has dignity and moral worth simply in virtue of being a person.91 There are at least 
two reasons why self-respect is important for autonomy. One is that self-respect and respectful 
treatment from others makes it more likely that a person will be autonomous. This is because 
autonomy and free agency “involves regarding oneself as having the normative authority to be 
self-determining and self-governing” and a lack of self-respect undermines one’s ability to 
perceive oneself as having that authority.92 It is also the case that “self-respect is needed to 
inspire others to reciprocate with a similar attitude of respect toward oneself.”93 This is because 
a lack of self-respect expresses to others that one does not take one’s ends seriously and is 
effectively inconsistent regarding what one finds valuable. Since one does not take one’s own 
ends seriously, and expresses this judgment to others, they too fail to take them seriously. 
This brief description of self-respect helps to illustrate why discrimination, if pervasive 
enough and based solely on contingent features of one’s identity, can be harmful and may 
undermine one’s ability to be a fully autonomous agent. Unequal treatment on the grounds of 
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one’s identity may give one the impression that one is not truly a person worthy of respect or 
that one’s choices and value judgments do not have worth simply because of whom one is. In 
order to instill self-respect in citizens, Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth have claimed that what 
is required are “legally institutionalized relations of universal respect for the autonomy and 
dignity of persons.”94 Two relevant questions at this juncture are whether we have such legally 
institutionalized relations now and whether granting narrowly-tailored exemptions to wedding 
vendors would undermine them.  
At this point, I do not believe that we do have legally institutionalized relations of 
universal respect for the autonomy and dignity of same-sex couples – at least not across the 
board. This is because, as the federal law currently stands, businesses can refuse service solely 
on the basis of the customer’s sexual orientation. I am happily willing to concede, however, 
that the federal law is insufficient and that the federal public accommodation statute should 
mirror those statutes which include sexual orientation as a protected class and which define 
places of public accommodation in a suitably broad way. In those states and municipalities 
where adequate public accommodation laws are in place, however, there are institutionalized 
relations of respect for the autonomy and dignity of same-sex couples – at least in the realm of 
public accommodations. 
The question of whether granting narrowly-tailored exemptions to wedding vendors 
would undermine those relations is asking whether providing such exemptions would 
undermine the government’s obligation to respect the dignity and autonomy of all of its 
citizens. After all, while respecting the dignity and autonomy of fellow citizens may be a moral 
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obligation, it cannot be a legally enforceable one as that would involve literally coercing citizens 
to have particular beliefs and to act on those beliefs. The best we can hope for is that the 
government institutes regulations which respect the dignity and autonomy of all citizens as 
thoroughly as possible. The government does this in the public accommodation context by 
passing laws which make it illegal to refuse service to somebody based solely on the fact that 
they have certain immutable identity characteristics (sex, race, sexual orientation, etc). This 
respects their dignity and autonomy because it does not allow them to be excluded from the 
public marketplace due to an immalleable aspect of their personal identity.  
However, the government also needs to respect the autonomy and dignity of wedding 
vendors with religious objections to same-sex marriage. Simply asserting that the fact that they 
have such objections plays no role the social policy calculus at all displays a lack of respect for 
an important part of their identity – their identity as a Christian and as an individual who wants 
to operate their business in line with Christian principles. It also does not respect their 
autonomy by compelling them to either participate in a religious ceremony they find offensive 
or by undermining their ability to control the content of their expression.  
The narrowly-tailored scheme of exemptions I propose is a compromise between 
competing autonomy and equality interests. It still respects the equal dignity of same-sex 
couples by only granting exemptions to those vendors who have additional reason to 
discriminate other than the personal identity of the customer. However, while Koppelman is 
correct that same-sex couples should not be protected from harms which result from others 
expressing disagreement with their lifestyles, they can and should be protected from 
discrimination which is only justified by the fact that they share certain identity characteristics. 
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This scheme of exemptions also respects the autonomy of wedding vendors by granting 
exemptions to those vendors whose autonomy is burdened the most.  
§4. Objections and Concluding Remarks 
I conclude in this section by considering a series of objections. The first is that, contrary 
to what I have argued in prior sections, allowing narrowly tailored exemptions would lead to a 
whole series of exemptions to anti-discrimination laws beyond those which regulate public 
accommodations. I do recognize that this is a possibility depending on how the exemptions 
were granted. It is possible that courts, in granting the types of exemptions I propose, could set 
precedent that would lead to a type of slippery slope. But a convincing argument for this claim 
would have to rely on the actual language that the courts use in granting exemptions and 
whether certain rules of adjudication were developed. Given the fact that these exemptions 
have not been granted, it is difficult to accept that this argument is sound. Furthermore, courts 
are not the only avenue for exemptions to be granted. It is possible, and perhaps preferable, for 
the exemptions I propose to be granted by the legislature. If specific language referring to 
wedding vendors and public accommodations was utilized in drafting legislation granting 
exemptions, it is difficult to see why any kind of broad slippery slope would arise as a 
consequence. 
One could still argue, however, that even within the public accommodation context, the 
exemptions I propose would be broader than I admit or realize. I can only say to this point that 
it might be true and, if true, would provide a reason for modifying my account. However, as I 
suggested earlier, I believe that the vendors who fit into the two categories I put forward (to 
reiterate, those categories are vendors whose conduct is inherently expressive and those who, 
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by providing goods or services for weddings, are active participants in the wedding 
ceremonies), would be quite narrow. Unlike the religious liberty approach explored in the first 
section, I do not believe that these exemptions would exclude same-sex couples from an entire 
part of the public marketplace. All of the same types of venues – be they bakeries, 
photographers or restaurants – would remain open to them. They can just not compel that 
these businesses engage in any expressive artistry for their wedding ceremony or compel them 
to participate in it. Such is the price of citizenship in a society which values religious liberty and 
freedom of expression. 
The other objections which I will address have been provided in a recent piece written 
by Christie Hartley and Lori Watson. It will be worth quoting the summary of their position at 
length so that I can respond to it point by point: 
Here the vendor seeks an exemption from a law whose purpose is to enable and protect 
a person’s standing as an equal citizen. That is, the antidiscrimination law in question 
protects a person’s ability to participate in various spheres of social life as an equal 
member of society and the ability of the person to pursue a view of the good like fellow 
citizens. In other words, allowing public discrimination on the basis of factors such as 
sexual orientation, sex, or race creates a kind of second-class citizenship for some 
members of society. Such persons don’t enjoy the same access to goods, even if 
identical goods are available elsewhere. And insofar as being denied the rights and 
liberties that other persons as citizens enjoy in places of public accommodation affects 
their standing in the public, political sphere, their ability to engage in public reasoning is 
compromised. Someone might claim that the liberty of the vendor to refuse service to a 
same-sex couple is a matter of equal standing, too; one might say it is important to 
one’s standing as an equal citizen to enjoy the liberty to live in accordance with beliefs 
and values fundamental to one’s identity. But this is precisely why understanding the 
role of the criterion of reciprocity and political liberalism’s view of public reason is so 
important.95 
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It may be clear from some of my earlier statements and arguments where I disagree with 
Hartley and Watson but it will be worth it to conclude on these points as I take them to be 
fundamental disagreements that would likely occur between other political liberals and myself.  
 To begin, I will note a couple of areas of agreement which might be unsurprising. I agree 
that the purpose of public accommodation laws is, at least in part, to enable and protect a 
person’s standing as an equal citizen. I also agree that the undermining of this equal standing in 
the public accommodation context may very well affect their standing in other public and 
political spheres. Where I expect the locus of our disagreement lies is what we ought to mean 
by equal standing and what the criterion of reciprocity entails. 
 First, there is some potential disagreement regarding what it means for a business to 
discriminate “on the basis of” sexual orientation. As I argued earlier, it is at least plausible for 
Jack Phillips, for example, to make the argument that he is not refusing service to same-sex 
couples on the basis of their sexual orientation. He may argue that he is refusing service 
because he does not want to express a message he finds disagreeable. As I also stated earlier, 
courts have interpreted discrimination on the basis of specified characteristics to mean that, 
but for the fact that the individuals had a particular characteristic, they would not have been 
refused service. This seems true in the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop but, as I also pointed out, 
there seem to be situations in which the customer’s identity may not have been implicated but 
where he or she would have been denied service anyway (if they were not gay but were 
purchasing the cake for a same-sex wedding, etc.). 
 Hartley and Watson also echo a point I made earlier when they suggested that someone 
might argue that “one might say it is important to one’s standing as an equal citizen to enjoy 
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the liberty to live in accordance with beliefs and values fundamental to one’s identity.”96 This 
point is similar to my argument concerning the government’s role in respecting the autonomy 
of all citizens. However, they then imply that this belief relies on a misunderstanding of the 
criterion of reciprocity. I will first repeat my belief that there are actually equality interests on 
both sides of the disputes – not just on the side of the same-sex couples who are refused 
service. I will then conclude by discussing how I understand the criterion of reciprocity and why 
a narrowly-tailored scheme of exemptions is consistent with it. 
 Watson and Hartley are right to point out that the equal standing of marginalized 
citizens is important and is a fundamental purpose of anti-discrimination provisions. However, 
guaranteeing the equal treatment of same-sex couples by privately owned businesses in the 
public marketplace necessarily guarantees the unequal treatment of religious wedding vendors 
by the government. It is not difficult to see why this is the case. Public accommodation laws 
compel business owners like Jack Phillips to provide goods or services for same-sex weddings, 
even when they believe that doing so is in violation of their religious obligations. Liberals like 
Watson and Hartley rightly maintain that doing so is necessary in order to protect their equal 
standing as a citizen. But this clearly entails involving the government in distributing an unequal 
scheme of burdens and benefits. Those business owners who do not believe that same-sex 
marriage is sinful do not have to choose between violating their conscience and violating the 
law. Public accommodation laws do not burden them in the same way that they burden 
business owners who do believe that same-sex marriage is sinful. 
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 Of course, that fact alone does not entail anything about the legitimacy or just nature of 
the laws in question. Any substantial system of laws or regulations is going to burden some 
citizens over others. For example, laws against murder burden those citizens whose conception 
of the good life prioritizes murdering people. The fact that this is true should convince nobody 
that laws against murder are not legitimate and just. But the framework which Vallier 
developed is set up to exclude exactly those types of cases. That being said, I can see only three 
reasons (independent of whether my arguments thus far have been sound) why we should 
discount the equal standing of religious business owners or their liberty interests in the way 
that Watson and Hartley seem to suggest we ought to: 1) The equal standing of same-sex 
couples is at greater risk to be compromised in various political or social spheres than the equal 
standing of religious business owners is. 2) Business owners who believe that they have a 
religious obligation to refuse to provide goods or services to same-sex couples are 
unreasonable or, at the very least, are acting unreasonably. 3) The scheme of exemptions I am 
defending in this paper does not abide by the criterion of reciprocity as it is not one that all 
reasonable people can accept. I will discuss each of these in turn. 
 The claim that the equal standing of same-sex couples is at greater risk compared to the 
standing of religious business owners is likely true in many contexts. However, as I have already 
shown, the approval for same-sex marriage is on a strong upward trend. Obviously, this trend 
does not do anything about the fact that there remain huge holes in LGBTQ anti-discrimination 
protections and the fact that being refused service on the basis of an essential part of one’s 
identity can be a traumatic and harmful experience. However, there are certainly contexts in 
which the equal standing of religious business owners is at greater risk and I would argue that 
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the public accommodation context is slowly becoming one of those. There have been several 
business owners who have either lost their business, their professional reputation or thousands 
of dollars – sometimes as the result of a disagreement about the moral status of particular 
conduct (namely, same-sex weddings). I would argue that the equal standing of certain religious 
business owners and their ability to run their business in line with their religious convictions is 
at great risk in progressive states with robust anti-discrimination regulations. This is especially 
true if we are to agree with the view that such is the ‘cost of citizenship’ and that religious 
business owners should be expected to compromise their religious beliefs if they open up a 
business to the public. Sometimes this is necessary, and it has been the project of this paper to 
draw a practicable line between cases where it is and those where it is not, but to treat the 
equality and liberty interests on one side as categorically inferior to the interests on the other 
seems to me to be a significant threat to the equal standing of religious business owners. 
 The second claim is that the religious business owners I have been discussing are either 
unreasonable or are acting unreasonably. When political liberals use the term ‘reasonable,’ it is 
often referred to as a term of art. Going back to Rawls, political liberals claim that “persons are 
reasonable in one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are ready to propose principles 
and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance 
that others will likewise do so.”97 Certainly there are many religious people who are 
unreasonable or consistently act unreasonably (just as there are many non-religious people 
who do the same). Religious citizens who would enforce their own moral views by overturning 
the marriage equality decision are a perfect example of this unreasonableness in action. But if 
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we go to the two broad groups of vendors who warrant exemptions under my view, it is not 
clear why we should say that these are unreasonable people. There are many wedding vendors 
who are probably fine with same-sex marriage being a legal institution. At the very least, many 
of them have likely recognized that the Supreme Court has ruled in Obergefell that marriage 
equality is constitutionally required and that same-sex marriages are here to stay. These 
vendors are not taking to the streets demanding that the right for same-sex couples to marry 
be revoked. What they want is to not be compelled by law to either participate in a same-sex 
wedding ceremony or express a message of recognition for the legitimacy of same-sex 
weddings. This does not seem unreasonable to me. 
 This point is closely related to the final objection I will consider which is that the scheme 
of exemptions I defend does not fulfill the criterion of reciprocity. The criterion of reciprocity 
dates back to Rawls and it outlines when exercise of political power is proper. Rawls wrote that 
“our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we 
offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as justification of 
those actions.”98 Citizens fulfill this criterion of reciprocity by utilizing public reasons when 
attempting to justify political power (constitutional amendments, legislation, government 
regulation, etc.). Public reasons according to Rawls are reasons which do not rely on any 
particular religious or philosophical worldview but can be accepted by citizens as free and equal 
participants of civil society. 
 The suggestion that the scheme of exemptions I propose does not fulfill the criterion of 
reciprocity rests on the claim that the reasons justifying it are not ones that all citizens can 
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reasonably accept. Furthermore, this claim goes back to one of the conditions which Vallier set 
out in his framework: the intelligibility requirement. Since the intelligibility requirement allows 
explicitly sectarian reasons to serve as justificatory reasons, it is open for liberals in the 
Rawlsian vein to object that these are reasons that not everybody can reasonably accept. After 
all, one of the justificatory reasons for Phillips relies explicitly on Biblical authority. Obviously, 
citizens who do not see the Bible as a source of authority have no particular reason to accept 
Phillips’ particular reasons as justificatory for them. Thus, the framework which Vallier 
developed does not abide by the criterion of reciprocity as Rawls defines it. 
 While I do agree with Vallier on the correct interpretation of public reason liberalism, I 
do also think that it is possible for the exemptions I defend to be justified by appealing to 
properly public reasons (in the Rawlsian sense). After all, much of the analysis I have 
undertaken in this paper has taken conventional constitutional jurisprudence as a starting 
point. While I remain ambivalent regarding the exact status of the right to be exempt from 
public accommodation laws and how it should be granted (whether it be basic or subsidiary; by 
judicial review or via legislative action), I have utilized reasons drawn from work on religious 
liberty and freedom of expression. Assuming that these are liberal values, and that they 
themselves can be justified via public reasons, there does not seem to be any particular 
obstacle to seeing my proposal as abiding by the Rawlsian criterion of reciprocity. The focal 
point of the disagreement between other political liberals and me would then seem to be in the 
details of the analysis, that is whether creating a customized wedding cake is really expressive 
or whether being compelled to participate in a wedding ceremony would be a real and 
substantial burden on one’s religious exercise. Obviously, I think that they are and have spent 
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the bulk of the paper arguing for that claim. Whether my proposal really does abide by the 
criterion of reciprocity, then, would seem to live or die by the soundness of my previous 
arguments. 
Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have provided a liberal argument for providing narrowly-tailored 
exemptions to public accommodation laws. My approach to this contentious issue has been to 
balance the equality and liberty interests on both sides of the dispute. That is, I believe that 
both the same-sex couples and religious vendors have equality and liberty interests at stake 
and it is my firm belief that a liberal approach should attempt to balance them. No doubt the 
proposal I have defended seems unsatisfactory to parties on both sides. Proponents of broad 
exemptions are likely to object that the categories of vendors which deserve exemptions under 
my account are too narrow and that I am leaving out many other business owners who hold 
religious objections to same-sex marriage but would be forced by law to facilitate same-sex 
wedding ceremonies. On the other hand, opponents of exemptions are likely to object that I am 
allowing religious reasons to serve as justifications for bigotry and invidious discrimination. 
Needless to say, I do not believe that all people who have religious objections to same-sex 
marriage are ‘bigots’ or that all discrimination is necessarily ‘invidious.’ But I also do not believe 
that the government should exempt any and all business owners who have religious objections 
to same-sex marriage as this would undermine the primary purpose of anti-discrimination laws. 
What I have attempted to do, which I stated at the outset was my intent, is to provide a 
compromise. Such a compromise may seem unappealing to many but such compromises are 
necessary in societies defined by a plurality of opposing views and opinions. 
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